Culture does not, on the whole, seem to occupy a strategic, or even a minor but assured, place in most serious thinking about the sources and conditions of development. Economists tend to relegate it to the limbo of 'non-economic' factors. Marxists and radically inclined thinkers regard it as smoke-screen and rationalization or as a mere effect of the real phenomena, the structures of exploitation. It tends to get left to the moral exhortations which accompany the presentation of budgets and five-year plans, or else the private refiexions of planners. Yet it finds expression in a widespread feeling among laymen that a people's religious traditions, 'national character' and 'way of life' must have some effect, though an indeterminate one, on their material development.
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It is easy enough to find reasons for the neglect of culture for 'harder' factors like the terms of world trade, the structure of control over key resources, etc.1 The typical 'cultural' explanation has been a variant of either Weber's argument about the partial responsibility of Calvinism for capitalism or a psychologistic thesis which relates economic backwardness to the prevalence of an anti-modernizing personality.2 There are two well-founded lines of objection to most theories of this kind. Firstly, they tend to be logically circular or ill-demonstrated. Behaviour alleged to be anti-developmental is explained with reference to a personality type governed by certain values and those values in turn are merely inferred from the anti-developmental behaviour. Alleged religious values, such as Islam's fatalism or Hinduism's other-worldliness, are usually not adequately connected at the empirical level to the behaviour they are held to explain, and it is rarely established how much of an independent variable the culture is. Secondly, such theories are largely ideological. Their function is to assign the blame for under-development to the peoples of the Third respect to particular problems, and some outcomes have thus been the results of their purposes.
But any directionality of the whole has been the sum of the unintended consequences of this. But since the Enlightenment articulated the goal of mankind's perfectability, the hope has been that change for the better might be engineered beyond the horizon of the immediate problems. Development rests on the conviction that humanity can really turn history into a process of universal, Compare the very high levels of productivity of the Akan with the lower levels among the Yoruba, the other great cocoa producers of West Africa.9 Akan men were able to concentrate exclusively on cocoa, subsistence agriculture being undertaken by women, whereas the Yoruba farmers, since women play such a small role in agriculture, need to devote time to subsistence as well as cash-crop production. We can say little about the origin of these differing sex-roles in the economic organization of the two peoples. The rationality they each have is not a universal one, but a particularist one,'° and it is as part of culture that it has continued to shape contemporary performance.
In emphasising the importance of culture, I am urging that we need to analyse the historical roots of the conjuncture in which development is This seems to be the most fundamental argument for us to take the culture of the subjects of development seriouslyespecially for those of us who are not citizens of the less developed countries themselves. Academics produce culture. Who for? Insofar as it is for our own countries and governments, it is outside my present concern, though the same general arguments apply. For the rest, the culture produced is intended to affect in some way development in the Third World. A sustained conversation or the mutual translation of culture is the nature of our activity, rather than some kind of social engineering.'3 If our good faith is granted, it is, in the vital instance, the ideas of the subjects of development with which we must engage. If our activity is to have any consequences for ongoing processes of change, we must synthesize our own ideas with theirs, or invoke the criteria implicit in them or, if need be, try to show that they are mistaken in the assessment of their historical experience. Unless they are sensitive to the culture of the subjects of development, theorists of development will hardly fail to achieve the absurd posture of being, as it were, authors of plays which nobody is interested in performing. 
